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WRONGFUL DEATH IN ILLINOIS: A STATUTE
COMES OF AGE
Bullard v. Barnes
102 Ill. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (1984)
THOMAS S. ORR*
INTRODUCTION
The Illinois Supreme Court in Bullard v. Barnes I attempted to mod-
ernize the Illinois Wrongful Death Act2 by holding that the parents of a
minor child may recover under the Act for the loss of society of their
deceased child.3 This decision abrogates the traditional view that recov-
ery for the wrongful death of a child is limited strictly to the parents'
pecuniary injury, defined as the reasonable monetary value of the child's
services and economic contribution to the family unit.4 Specifically, the
Bullard court announced a presumption that the parents' loss of a child's
society is a pecuniary injury under the Wrongful Death Act.5 In addi-
tion, the historical Illinois presumption of loss of earnings by the death of
a minor was struck down as a useless anachronism of a former era.6 Fi-
nally, to more accurately reflect the parents' true pecuniary injury, the
court concluded that reasonably anticipated child rearing expenses must
be deducted from any award for loss of society and any proved loss of
income.
7
By its decision in Bullard, the Illinois Supreme Court has signifi-
cantly expanded the scope of damages available under the Wrongful
Death Act. Although the court has followed the predominate trend in
this area of the law, it has, in its haste to join the judicial crowd, lost
sight of the legislative intent of the Illinois statute. The court's inappro-
priate reliance on case law from other states and its failure to carefully
* B.A. Valparaiso University, 1970; Candidate for J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1987.
1. 102 Ill. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (1984).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1-2.2 (1983).
3. Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 517, 468 N.E.2d at 1234.
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
5. Bullard, 102 Ill. at 517, 468 N.E.2d at 1234.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 518, 468 N.E.2d at 1234-35.
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analyze Illinois legislative history and judicial precedent has resulted in
an unwarranted modification of a legislative remedy.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Illinois General Assembly first enacted a wrongful death statute
in 1853. That act created a right of action in the deceased's personal
representative to recover damages sustained by the surviving spouse or
next of kin resulting from the death of the deceased person.8 The statute
provides for damages which are "fair and just compensation with refer-
ence to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death."9 The original
statute limited the amount of any award for pecuniary injury to $5,000,
and although increased from time to time by legislative amendment, the
monetary limitation on damage awards was not completely eliminated
until 1967.10 The pecuniary injury limitation, however, has never been
changed or withdrawn by the legislature.
Despite the narrow scope of recovery seemingly allowed by the stat-
ute, Illinois courts have traditionally accepted a broad interpretation of
the term "pecuniary injury." For example, in the death of a father, a
child has long been able to recover damages for loss of instruction and
moral, physical, and intellectual training as pecuniary injuries.11 More-
over, recovery is not limited to the child's minority but also includes the
reasonable expectation of future benefits from the father during the
child's adult life. 12 Similarly, a surviving spouse is now permitted to re-
cover for loss of society and consortium as an element of pecuniary dam-
ages due to the wrongful death of the other spouse. t3 Thus, it is clear
that the definition of pecuniary injury in Illinois is broad enough to in-
clude various intangible items.
Although the broad definition of pecuniary injury did not extend to
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1-2.2. The original Illinois Act was a copy of the New York
statute which in turn was a copy of the first two sections of 9th and 10th Victoria, ch. 93 (1846)
commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 70, § 2, Historical Note
(Smith-Hurd 1984). For a concise history of the development of and need for a statutory remedy for
wrongful death, see generally, PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 5th Ed. § 127 (1984);
Speiser and Malawer, An American Tragedy: Damages for Mental Anguish of Bereaved Relatives in
Wrongful Death Actions, 51 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1976).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2.
10. Comment, Wrongful Death Recovery Limitations-R.LP., 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 385, 391-
92 (1968), where the author discusses the history of recovery limitations in the Illinois Wrongful
Death Act and the consequences of their complete removal.
11. Goddard v. Enzler, 222 Il1. 462, 78 N.E. 805 (1905).
12. Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 8 I11. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956).
13. Elliott v. Willis, 92 I11. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982).
BULLARD V. BARNES
recovery for loss of society in the death of a child,' 4 the apparent harsh-
ness of the Illinois rule was mitigated in two respects. First, if the wrong-
ful death action was brought on behalf of the surviving spouse or lineal
next of kin, there existed as a matter of law a presumption of pecuniary
loss arising from that relationship which shifted to the defendant the bur-
den of establishing contrary facts to rebut the presumption. 15 Accord-
ingly, for the death of a child, the law presumed that the parents had
suffered a pecuniary injury for which they could be compensated regard-
less of whether there was any evidence of pecuniary assistance from the
deceased.' 6 This presumption applied even when the decedent was an
adult.1 7 Second, the parents' recovery was not limited to the earnings or
services of the child during his minority. Damages could be awarded for
the pecuniary benefit which the parents might reasonably expect to ob-
tain from the child at any time in the future. 18 These two factors tended
to broaden the scope of pecuniary loss and therefore provided a judicial
atmosphere supportive of substantial monetary awards in cases involving
deaths of children.19
A review of the case law prior to Bullard discloses clear uniformity
among the Illinois courts in applying the pecuniary injury rule for the
wrongful deaths of children. Four of the five districts of the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court had held within the last five years that loss of a child's
society could not be recovered by the parents in a wrongful death ac-
tion.20 Kaiserman v. Bright 21 is typical of the earlier cases. Here, a mi-
14. See, e.g., Kaiserman v. Bright, 61 111. App. 3d 67, 377 N.E.2d 261 (lst Dist. 1978).
15. Hall v. Gillins, 13 11. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958); Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Il. 311, 83
N.E.2d 708 (1949); Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 I1. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928), overruled on other grounds;
McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966).
16. Flynn v. Vancil, 41 Ill. 2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237 (1968) (presumption of pecuniary loss
applied to potential recovery of the father where the decedent was a two-week old child); Rusher v.
Smith, 70 Ill. App. 3d 889, 388 N.E.2d 906 (5th Dist. 1979) (if the next of kin are parents, a pre-
sumption of pecuniary loss obtains that is sufficient to sustain a verdict awarding substantial dam-
ages even without any proof of actual loss); Mortensen v. Sullivan, 3 Ill. App. 3d 332, 278 N.E.2d 6
(2d Dist. 1972) (presumption of substantial damage arising by reason of the relationship between a
father and an 18 year-old son killed in an automobile accident).
17. Naslund v. Watts, 80 Ill. App. 2d 464, 224 N.E.2d 474 (3rd Dist. 1967).
18. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Warriner, 229 Ill. 91, 82 N.E. 246 (1907).
19. See, e.g., Baird v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 63 Ill. 2d 463, 349 N.E.2d 413 (1976) (Awards of
$188,000 each for the wrongful deaths of a 17 year-old high school girl and a 19 year-old college boy
survived by at least one parent were not excessive); Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 21 Ill.
App. 3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496 (1974), affd, 61 111. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975) (Award of $75,000
for the wrongful death of a 12 year-old boy who contributed monetarily to the family income and
helped care for younger siblings was not excessive); Maca v. Rock Island-Moline City Lines, 47 11.
App. 2d 31, 197 N.E.2d 463 (1964) (Award of $30,000 statutory limit for the wrongful death of a 7
year-old was not excessive).
20. See, Trotter v. Moore, 113 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1016, 447 N.E.2d 1340, 1344 (2d Dist. 1983),
rev'd, 468 N.E.2d 1236 (1984); Bullard v. Barnes, 112 Ill. App. 3d 384, 389, 445 N.E.2d 485, 490
(4th Dist. 1983), rev'd, 102 I1. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (1984); Rusher v. Smith, 70 Il1. App. 3d
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nor boy was struck and killed by a taxi cab after alighting from a school
bus in front of his house. In holding that the parents could not recover
for loss of the child's society, the court apparently felt this conclusion
was so obvious that it limited its reasoning to a terse statement that Illi-
nois law did not allow recovery for loss of society in wrongful death
actions.
22
The clarity of this position was partially obscured by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Elliott v. Willis. 23 In this case, a widow whose hus-
band was killed in an automobile collision with the defendant sought
damages in a wrongful death action for loss of consortium. The court
held that a spouse's society, companionship, and sexual relations were
capable of monetary evaluation by a jury and were therefore recoverable
as pecuniary injuries under the Wrongful Death Act.
24
Nonetheless, the appellate court in Trotter v. Moore25 was able to
distinguish Elliott from cases involving the deaths of children. First, the
Trotter court observed that the supreme court carefully limited its hold-
ing in Elliott to the loss of consortium of a spouse.26 Second, recovery for
loss of consortium of a deceased spouse, which was allowed in Elliott,
was recognized as arising out of a similar remedy at common law for
non-fatal injuries. Since there is no comparable remedy at common law
for loss of society for a non-fatal injury to a child, there was no basis for
including the remedy under the Wrongful Death Act.27 Thus, when Bul-
lard v. Barnes came before the Illinois Supreme Court, the Illinois appel-
late courts were in unanimous agreement that loss of a child's society was
not recoverable under the Wrongful Death Act.
THE COURT'S DECISION
Scott Bullard, a seventeen year old youth, was killed early one foggy
morning when the automobile he was driving collided with another vehi-
cle. Bullard was driving south on a two lane highway while a semi-
trailer truck owned by Redi-Mix, Inc. and driven by one of its employ-
ees, Barnes, was proceeding north behind two other vehicles. Despite the
fog, Barnes pulled into the southbound lane to pass both of the vehicles
889, 895, 388 N.E.2d 906, 911 (5th Dist. 1979); and Kaiserman v. Bright, 61 Ill. App. 3d 67, 69-70,
377 N.E.2d 261, 263-64 (1st Dist. 1978).
21. 61 Ill. App. 3d 67, 377 N.E.2d 261 (1978).
22. Id. at 70, 377 N.E.2d at 264.
23. 92 111. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982).
24. Id. at 540, 442 N.E.2d at 168.
25. 113 Il. App. 3d 1011, 447 N.E.2d 1340, rev'd, 468 N.E.2d 1236 (1984).
26. Id. at 1016, 447 N.E.2d at 1344.
27. Id.
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ahead of him forcing Bullard's vehicle off the road and out of control.
After veering back onto the pavement, Bullard's automobile crossed the
center line striking one of the northbound vehicles. Bullard died in the
hospital later that morning of injuries sustained in the crash.
Bullard's parents filed a multi-count complaint against Barnes and
Redi-Mix, Inc. seeking compensatory and punitive damages for negli-
gence and willful and wanton misconduct under the Wrongful Death
Act, the Survival Act, 28 and the Family Expense Act.29 The defendants
admitted liability under both the negligence and willful and wanton
counts. 30 In a bifurcated trial, the court first considered damages due
under the Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act 31 and instructed the
jury that in determining the amount of the parents' pecuniary injury,
they could consider the parents' loss of society with the decedent. The
jury awarded damages of $285,000 in the wrongful death claim and
$40,000 in the survival claim.
The defendants argued on appeal that the trial court's instruction
which included loss of society as an element of damages violated the pe-
cuniary injury limitation of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act. The appel-
late court agreed surmising that the trial court's decision to give the
instruction was based on a misinterpretation of the recent Elliott decision
allowing recovery for loss of consortium for the death of a spouse.32 The
appellate court did not interpret Elliott as applying in this case since the
court believed there is a qualitative difference between the consortium of
a spouse and the society of a child based on their common law histo-
ries.33 This difference led the court to conclude that the holding in Elliott
was strictly limited to the loss of consortium for a deceased spouse. 34
Thus, the jurors in Bullard had been improperly instructed, and, accord-
ingly, the case was remanded for a new trial on damages.
On appeal by the plaintiffs, the supreme court held that the loss of a
child's society was an element of pecuniary damages recoverable under
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, § 27-6 (1983) provides, inter alia, for survival of personal injury
and property damage claims which, of course, died with the victim at common law.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1015 (1983) provides, inter alia, for the recovery of medical,
hospital and funeral expenses which are not recoverable by the family under the Wrongful Death
Act.
30. The parties also agreed to damages of $3,236.10 under the Family Expense Act. 102 IIl. 2d
505, 511, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1231.
31. The second part of the trial included a stipulation to compensatory property damage of
$750 and a jury verdict of $500 in punitive property damage against defendant Barnes only. Id.
32. Bullard, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 389, 445 N.E.2d at 489-90.
33. Id. at 390, 455 N.E.2d at 490.
34. Id.
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the Wrongful Death Act.35 The court observed that most other states
with similar statutes include recovery for the loss of a child's society as
an element of pecuniary injury.
36
More importantly, the court noted that the trend in its own deci-
sions suggested an expansion of the scope of pecuniary damages to in-
clude nonmonetary losses. The court relied on its previous decisions in
Hall v. Gillins37 and Knierim v. IZZo, 35 where the term "pecuniary inju-
ries" was said by the court to be broadly interpreted. In each of these
cases, the plaintiffs initiated common law tort actions for "destruction of
the family unit" in addition to statutory wrongful death actions. The
damages sought in Hall consisted of loss of support, companionship, gui-
dance, advice, and affection of the husband and father. 39 Similarly, the
damages sought in Knierim included loss of consortium on behalf of the
widow.4° In each case, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims at com-
mon law because the action was abated by the Wrongful Death Statute
which provided an adequate remedy for the damages sought.
41
The court in Bullard also relied on its most recent decision in Elliott
v. Willis.42 In addition to sanctioning the recovery for a spouse's loss of
consortium, the court pointed out that the decision in Elliott also made a
sharp distinction between damages for mental anguish, which are never
recoverable under the Wrongful Death Act, and damages for loss of soci-
ety.43 The purpose of drawing this distinction in Elliott was to criticize
35. Bullard v. Barnes, 102 I11. 2d at 517, 468 N.E.2d at 1234.
36. In support of this observation the court cited the following cases: Williams v. Dowling, 318
F.2d 642, 644 (3d Cir. 1963); American R.R. Co. v. Santiago, 9 F.2d 753, 758 (1st Cir. 1926);
Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 68, 562 P.2d 1022, 1025, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 866 (1977); Volk v.
Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 573, 651 P.2d 11, 14 (1982); Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439,
448 (Iowa 1971); Smith v. City of Detroit, 388 Mich. 637, 649, 202 N.W.2d 300, 303 (1972); Fossner
v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 359, 113 N.W.2d 355, 363 (1961); Sanders v. Mount Haggin Livestock
Co., 160 Mont. 73, 89-90, 500 P.2d 397, 406 (1972); Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 279-80,
207 N.W.2d 686, 689 (1973), afl'd, 192 Neb. 291, 220 N.W.2d 222 (1974); Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J.
1, 4, 424 A.2d 210, 211 (1980); Anderson v. Lake, 88 S.D. 111, 115-22, 216 N.W.2d 152, 155-58
(1974); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983); Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 110
n.3 (Utah 1982); Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 117, 426 P.2d 605, 609 (1967). 102 III. 2d at
512-14, 468 N.E.2d at 1232.
37. 13 111. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958). In this case, Owen Hall was fatally injured in an
automobile accident. His widow and surviving nine year-old son filed suit against the defendant
alleging negligence and requesting damages of $142,450 for the widow and $47,500 for the son.
38. 22 Il1. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961). In this case, the plaintiff brought suit against an
individual and several tavern operators alleging that the individual defendant while intoxicated had
murdered her husband.
39. Hall, 13 Ill. 2d at 27, 147 N.E.2d at 353.
40. Knierim, 22 Ill. 2d at 81, 174 N.E.2d at 162.
41. Hall, 13 Ill. 2d at 30-32, 147 N.E.2d at 355; Knierim, 22 Il. 2d at 82, 83, 174 N.E.2d at
162-63.
42. 92 Ill. 2d 530, 442 N.E.2d 163 (1982).
43. Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 514-15, 468 N.E.2d at 123.
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the appellate court in Kaiserman v. Bright 4 for failing to make that dis-
tinction. The court suggested its criticism of this appellate opinion, in
which recovery for loss of a child's society was not allowed under the
Wrongful Death Act, was a strong indication that it did not agree with
the conclusion of the appellate court. 45 In view of its previous holdings
in Hall, Knierim and Elliott, the court concluded that it would now be
anomalous to deny recovery for loss of a child's society.
46
The Bullard court also eliminated the presumption of loss of earn-
ings and replaced it with a presumption of pecuniary injury based on loss
of the child's society. In reflecting on the history and purpose of wrong-
ful death actions as they pertain to children, the court noted that the
presumption that parents receive significant economic contribution from
their children, while perhaps true in the nineteenth century, is com-
pletely unrealistic in today's family life.47 Although the presumption of
loss of earnings would no longer apply, the court stated that recovery
could be obtained where it was proved that the child earned income used
to support the family.48 Since the question was not before the court, the
majority chose not to decide whether the new presumption applied to
adult children.
49
Finally, the court held that in computing a wrongful death award,
the jurors must be instructed to deduct reasonable, projected child-rear-
ing expenses from any award for loss of society and any proved loss of
income. 50 Here, the court carried its previous argument concerning the
44. 61 Ill. App. 3d 67, 377 N.E.2d 261 (1978). The supreme court accused the 1st District
Appellate Court of misciting the supreme court's decision in Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua
Hosp., 23 Ill. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303 (1961) as support for its holding in Kaiserman. In reality, said
the supreme court, the decision in Zostautas held that the parent's mental anguish was not recover-
able in a wrongful death action and did not discuss recovery for loss of society. Elliott, 92 Ill. 2d at
538-39, 442 N.E.2d at 167.
45. All of this confusion over Kaiserman led the appellate court in Bullard to conclude that the
supreme court's failure to overrule Kaiserman in Elliott meant that Kaiserman was still good law.
Bullard v. Barnes, 112 I11. App. 3d at 389, 445 N.E.2d at 490. Unfortunately, the appellate court in
Bullard failed to consider that Elliott dealt only with the loss of consortium of a spouse. The Elliott
court did not overrule the Kaiserman holding because the question of recovery for a child's loss of
society was not the question before the court.
46. Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 515, 468 N.E.2d at 1233.
47. Id. at 516, 468 N.E.2d at 1233. In explaining this position the court quoted the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 352-53, 113 N.W.2d 355, 359 (1961):
It must be conceded that the majority of today's children render far less service to their
parents than did children in the last century .... Because of child-labor laws and the great
increase in school and college attendance, fewer children work outside the home. It should
be agreed that generally the child's earnings may go no further than to supplement the
parent's considerable financial outlay in educating and rearing him.
Id.
48. Id. at 517, 468 N.E.2d at 1234.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 518, 468 N.E.2d at 1234-35.
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economic role of children in modem family life one step farther by recog-
nizing the substantial expenses associated with child-rearing. After not-
ing that many jurisdictions which hold pecuniary injury to include loss of
a child's society also deduct child-rearing expenses in arriving at a final
damage figure,51 the court concluded that the deduction of child-rearing
expenses was the only accurate method of determining the parents' true
pecuniary loss.52 Since the jury in this case was not instructed to deduct
child-rearing expenses from its award, the case was remanded for a new
trial on damages.
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Clark agreed with the majority
in allowing parents to recover damages for the loss of society in the
wrongful death of their children. However, he did not agree with the set-
off of child-rearing expenses which he considered to be an inequitable
reduction in the award. 53 In addition, Justice Clark disagreed with the
majority's decision to limit the opinion to minor children. He believed
that the same logic applies to the loss of society of an emancipated child
as to a minor child, and that consequently the computation of damages
should be the same.
54
ANALYSIS
The decision in Bullard v. Barnes will no doubt receive overwhelm-
ing support as a long needed reform to an outdated system. 55 Indeed,
there is little question that this decision follows the modem trend and
aligns Illinois with the majority of states in allowing parents to recover
for loss of society in the wrongful death of their children.5 6 Nonetheless,
51. See the cases cited at 102 Ill. 2d at 518, 468 N.E.2d at 1234.
52. Id. at 518, 468 N.E.2d at 1234-35.
53. Id. at 521, 468 N.E.2d at 1236 (Clark, J., concurring). Justice Clark noted that since the
decedent was 17 years old at the time of his death, a setoff for college and other living expenses could
substantially reduce the award.
54. Id. For example, the advice, companionship, and assistance of an adult child is just as
beneficial to a parent as the society of a minor child. Id.
55. The pecuniary injury rule has come under increasing criticism in recent years. Most com-
mentators have focused on the harshness of the rule which, if strictly applied, may preclude recovery
altogether where the deceased child made no economic contribution to the family. See, e.g., Note,
Wrongful Death Damages in Pennsylvania: A Suggestion for Expanded Recovery, 22 DUQ. L. REV.
887, 893 (1984). Others have questioned the fairness of a rule which fails to provide any considera-
tion for the parents' emotional loss or mental anguish. See, e.g., Speiser & Malawer, supra note 8.
Still others have noted that in modern society significant economic contributions are not expected
from children rendering the pecuniary injury rule woefully out of date. See, e.g., Note, Wrongful
Death of Children-The Real Injury, 5 WEST. ST. U.L. REV. 253, 59 (1978). Finally, some com-
mentators have theorized that the pecuniary injury rule is difficult for juries to understand and apply
thus resulting in wildly erratic verdicts. See Finkelstein, Pickrel & Glasser, The Death of Children, A
Non-Parametric Statistical Analysis of Compensation for Anguish, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 884, 892
(1974).
56. Thirty-seven states and territories now allow recovery for loss of society in the wrongful
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there remain some lingering doubts concerning the methodology used to
effect this modernization of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act. First, the
court's reliance on case law from other jurisdictions is inappropriate con-
sidering the differences in language among the various wrongful death
acts in other states. Second, the inclusion of loss of society as an element
of pecuniary damages violates the strict intent of the statutory language.
Finally, Illinois judicial precedent does not lead inexorably, as claimed
by the court, to its conclusion in Bullard as a matter of logic. In view of
these analytical weaknesses it is perhaps more appropriate that such a
significant liberalization of a statutorily created remedy be made by the
legislature.
The court in Bullard first attempted to justify its judicial amend-
ment of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act by suggesting that the majority
of states which limit wrongful death recovery to pecuniary damages now
allow parental recovery for loss of a child's society.57 Although literally
true, this characterization is oversimplified and misleading. Wrongful
death statutes may be classified into three categories in reference to their
treatment of recovery for loss of society and companionship of a de-
ceased child: (1) statutes expressly allowing recovery; (2) statutes al-
lowing damages which are fair and just; and (3) statutes expressly
limiting recovery to pecuniary loss.58 While the twenty-two statutes in
category one59 can easily be distinguished and eliminated from further
discussion, the court in Bullard failed to make any distinction between
the category two and the category three statutes.
Wrongful death statutes falling within category two generally per-
mit damages to be recovered which are fair and just without specifically
death of children. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
57. The court points out that 14 states out of 23 allow parental recovery for loss of a child's
society. See supra note 36.
58. Comment, Wrongful Death Damages: Recovery of Investment in and Society and Compan-
ionship of a Child, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (1966).
59. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-909 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 663-3 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633-336 (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904
(1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.135 (1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (Supp.
1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904(d) (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2
(Michie/Law. Co-Op. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.090 (Vernon Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2
(1984); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1055 (West
1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 30-020 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 1492(b) (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE
§ 8.01-52 (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (1981); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (Supp. 1982);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (Supp. 1982); Wyo. STAT. § 1-38-102 (Supp. 1982).
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limiting the damages to economic or pecuniary losses. Typical examples
are the Utah statute, which provides that "such damages may be given
under all circumstances of the case as may be just,"60 and the Texas stat-
ute, which provides that "[t]he jury may give such damages as they may
think proportionate to the injury resulting from such death ... .
Although there is no express limitation in category two statutes, courts in
many of the states having such statutes established a pecuniary injury
limitation through early judicial interpretation.62 As times changed and
the pecuniary injury limitation came under increasing criticism, it was a
relatively easy matter for these courts to "modernize" their wrongful
death acts by simply modifying or overruling their previous decisions.
The list of states with category two statutes which now allow recovery
for loss of a child's society include ten of the fourteen states cited by the
Bullard court.
63
In contrast, category three wrongful death acts contain specific lan-
guage expressly limiting recovery to pecuniary loss. A good example is
section 2 of the Illinois statute which provides that "the jury may give
such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with refer-
ence to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death. . ... 64 The
60. UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 78, § 11-7 (1983 Supp.).
61. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 4677 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
62. Most of the American state wrongful death acts were copied from the English Fatal Acci-
dent Act of 1846, 9 & 10 VicT., c. 93 (1846) also known as Lord Campbell's Act. The English Act
provided that "the jury may give such damages as they think proportioned to the injury resulting
from such death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be
brought . . ." Id. at § 2. Despite the broad measure of damages quoted above, the English courts
invariably interpreted Lord Campbell's Act to limit the award for damages to pecuniary loss. Thus,
in Blake v. Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 41 (Q.B. 1852), where the plaintiff sued a railroad
company for negligence resulting in the wrongful death of her husband, the court stated, "[i]t seems
to us that, if the Legislature had intended to go to the extreme length of giving, not only compensa-
tion for pecuniary loss, but a solatium to all the relations ... language more clear and appropriate
for this purpose would have been employed." Similarly, in Gillard v. Lancashire & Y. R.R., 12
L.T.R. 356 (1848), the jury was instructed that Lord Campbell's Act did not allow for recovery of
damages for the grief of the survivors. Since most of the American wrongful death acts were based
on the English Act, the English cases interpreting Lord Campbell's Act became logical precedent for
the American courts resulting in a narrow interpretation of available damages. Speiser & Malawer,
supra note 8, at 5-8.
63. Arizona: City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 105 Ariz. 429, 466 P.2d 383 (1970); California:
Krause v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 526 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977); Idaho: Volk v.
Baldago, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982); Indiana: Am. Car Loading Corp. v. Gary Trust & Say.
Bank, 216 Ind. 649, 25 N.E.2d 777 (1940); Louisiana: Marceleno v. State Dep't of Highways, 367
So. 2d 882 (La. App. 1978), cert. denied, 369 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1979); Mississippi: Boroughs v.
Oliver, 226 Miss. 609, 85 So. 2d 191 (1956); Montana: Swanson v. Champion Int'l Corp., 197 Mont.
509, 696 P.2d 1166 (1982); South Carolina: Nance v. State Bd. of Educ., 277 S.C. 64, 282 S.E.2d 848
(S.C. 1981); South Dakota: Anderson v. Lake, 88 S.D. 111, 216 N.W.2d 152 (1974); Texas: Sanchez
v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983); Utah: Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982); Puerto
Rico: American R.R. Co. v. Santiago, 9 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1926); Virgin Islands: Williams v. Dow-
ling, 318 F.2d 642 (3d Cir. 1963).
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2.
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distinction between a judicially imposed limitation and a legislatively
mandated limitation is significant and accounts for the fact that only four
(Minnesota, Michigan, Nebraska, and New Jersey) category three stat-
utes have been interpreted to include loss of a child's society as an ele-
ment of damage.
With the exception of Minnesota,65 the other state court decisions
interpreting pecuniary injury limitations in their statutes are not particu-
larly persuasive support for the Illinois court. In Selders v. Armentrout,
the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that the pecuniary loss rule was es-
sentially judicially created and that the word "pecuniary" in its wrongful
death statute referred only to the method of apportioning the amount of
recovered damages among the beneficiaries. 66 The Michigan Supreme
Court's decision allowing parental recovery for loss of a child's society in
Wycko v. Gnodtke 67 was questioned and restricted to its facts by a subse-
quent supreme court decision. 68 It was only after the legislature passed
an amendment to the Wrongful Death Act specifically allowing recovery
for loss of society that the decision in Wycko was reinstated by the
court. 69 Finally, in Green v. Bittner,70 the New Jersey Supreme Court
was so tentative in construing the statutory pecuniary injury limitation to
allow recovery for loss of a child's society that the court restricted recov-
ery to the value of equivalent services which could be obtained from a
hired stranger.71 Although these decisions support the Bullard court in
expanding the pecuniary loss standard, they are hardly effective in pro-
viding strong support for the argument that the reform is best accom-
plished by the courts.72
65. In Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 354, 113 N.W.2d 355, 359 (1961), the court said
unequivocably that "it should be acknowledged that the death-by-wrongful-act statute is remedial in
character and it is the court's duty to construe it liberally in light of current social conditions."
66. 190 Neb. 275, 276, 207 N.W.2d 686, 687-88 (1973), affid, 192 Neb. 291, 220 N.W.2d 222
(1974).
67. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
68. Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970).
69. Smith v. City of Detroit, 388 Mich. 637, 202 N.W.2d 300 (1972).
70. 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980).
71. Id. at 12, 424 A.2d at 215. The court explained its rigid posture as follows:
Companionship and advice in this context must be limited strictly to their pecuniary ele-
ment .... [a]nd its value must be confined to what the marketplace would pay a stranger
with similar qualifications for performing such services. No pecuniary value may be attrib-
uted to the emotional pleasure that a parent gets when it is his or her child doing the
caretaking rather than a stranger, although such pleasure will often be the primary value of
the child's service, indeed, in reality, its most beneficial aspect.... We recognize that our
prohibition against such damages deprives the surviving parent of compensation for the
real loss. That prohibition is not a matter of our choice, rather it is fundamental to the
legislation.
Id. at 12-13, 424 A.2d at 215-16 (footnotes omitted).
72. Courts in other jurisdictions with category three wrongful death statutes have not inter-
preted the phrase "pecuniary injuries" to include loss of a child's society and continue to limit
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Other jurisdictions have recognized that authority for reform of
their wrongful death statutes rests with the legislature. For example,
New York courts have often criticized the strict pecuniary loss limitation
in their statute and have urged the legislature to change it.73 Yet they
have not attempted to usurp the legislature's authority in that regard. In
Ohio, the supreme court, in Keaton v. Ribbeck held that the term pecuni-
ary injury used in their wrongful death statute did not include loss of a
child's society.74 The court noted that it was bound by the legislative
intent at the time of the statute's enactment, and the fact that the legisla-
ture did not eliminate the pecuniary loss requirement when it last
amended the recoverable damages section of the Act signified its accept-
ance of the strict meaning of that provision. 75 The court concluded that
any change in the statute should therefore come from the legislature.
Shortly after this decision, the Ohio General Assembly did amend the
Wrongful Death Act to specifically include recovery for loss of a child's
society.
76
The Illinois legislature similarly has had several opportunities to
consider the adequacy of damages recoverable under the Wrongful
Death Act. The original damage limitation of $5,000 was legislatively
increased five times77 until it was eliminated entirely in 1967.78 In addi-
tion, section two of the Act has been amended three other times in recent
years.79 Since Illinois courts consistently refused to include loss of soci-
ety as pecuniary injury under the Wrongful Death Act,80 the restrictive
recovery to economic damages. See, e.g., Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 N.Y.2d 622, 635, 404 N.E.2d 1288,
1292, 427 N.Y.S.2d 746, 750 (1980); Jones v. Hildebrant, 191 Colo. 1, 4, 550 P.2d 339, 342 (1976);
Tumcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173, 183-85 (1st Cir. 1974) (interpreting Rhode Island's
wrongful death act); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 81 N.M. 69, 463 P.2d 45, 48 (1969), affd, 81 N.M. 348,
467 P.2d 14 (1970).
73. See Gary v. Schwartz, 71 Misc. 2d 332, 339 N.Y.S.2d 39, modified, 43 A.D.2d 562, 349
N.Y.S.2d 322 (1972); Fornaro v. Jill Bros., 42 N.Y. Misc. 2d 1031, 249 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct.
1964), rev'don other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 695, 253 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1964), afl'd, 15 N.Y.2d 819,
205 N.E.2d 862, 257 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1965).
74. 58 Ohio St. 2d 443, 444-45, 391 N.E.2d 307, 308 (1979).
75. Id. The pecuniary injury limitation contained in § 2125.02 was first construed to exclude
loss of society in Karr v. Sixt, 146 Ohio St. 527, 67 N.E.2d 331 (1946). The statute was last amended
on November 21, 1969 to expand recoverable damages to include funeral expenses. Id.
76. OHflo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Supp. 1983).
77. The original limitation was increased to $10,000 in 1903 (1903 Il1. Laws 217); to $15,000 in
1947 (1947 Ill. Laws 1094); to $20,000 in 1951 (1951 Ill. Laws 393); to $25,000 in 1955 (1955 Ill.
Laws 2006); and to $30,000 in 1957 (1957 Ill. Laws 1939).
78. 1967 Il1. Laws 3227.
79. 1973 Ill. Laws 2669, 1977 Ill. Laws 2122, 1979 Ill. Laws 3285.
80. See, e.g., Graul v. Adrian, 32 Il1. 2d 345, 205 N.E.2d 444 (1965); Allendorf v. Elgin J. & E.
Ry., 8 II1. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); Curtiss v. County of Cook, 109
Ill. App. 3d 400, 440 N.E.2d 942 (1st Dist. 1982), modified, 98 11. 2d 158, 456 N.E.2d 116 (1983);
Kaiserman v. Bright, 61 111. App. 3d 67, 377 N.E.2d 261 (1st Dist. 1978); Conover v. Harrisburg &
S. Coal Co., 161 Ill. App. 74 (1910); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Burke, 101 Ill. App. 486 (1902).
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nature of that provision must have been clear to the legislature. Yet de-
spite reviewing the damages provision of the Act on numerous occasions,
the General Assembly chose not to alter or eliminate the pecuniary in-
jury standard. Moreover, legislation which would have expanded dam-
ages under the Wrongful Death Act to include loss of society was
considered and rejected by the 82nd General Assembly in both its 1981
and 1982 sessions.8 1 This is a clear indication of the legislature's intent
to maintain the pecuniary injury limitation which, therefore, should not
be disturbed by the court.8
2
The supreme court's second premise was that its previous decisions
interpreting the Wrongful Death Act provided strong precedent to ex-
pand the scope of pecuniary injuries in the death of a child. This prem-
ise, however, was partially based on an unfounded reliance on Hall v.
Gillins.8 3 In this case, the plaintiffs' primary purpose was to circumvent
the statutory $25,000 recovery limit in a wrongful death action by creat-
ing a new cause of action for "destruction of the family unit." The Bul-
lard court read Hall as indicating that the Wrongful Death Act provided
damages analogous with those being sought by the plaintiffs in their im-
aginative common law actions.8 4 On the contrary, the Hall court did not
state that the wrongful death remedy contained all the damage elements
sought by the plaintiffs, but merely that the current remedy was adequate
enough to preclude the creation of a new claim.85
In noting that the term "pecuniary injury" has been interpreted
broadly in past decisions, the Hall court was referring to the "presump-
tion of pecuniary loss [which] obtains from the relationship, alone, suffi-
cient to sustain a verdict and judgment awarding substantial damages,
81. I Legislative Synopsis and Digest of the 1982 Session of the 82nd General Assembly 697
(Legislative Reference Bureau, February 11, 1983).
82. Union Electric Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 77 Ill. 2d 364, 380, 396 N.E.2d 510, 517
(1979) (the reenactment of a statute which has been judicially construed is an adoption of that
construction by the legislature unless a contrary intent appears). See also, Stryker v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 74 Ill. 2d 507, 386 N.E.2d 36 (1978); Hupp v. Gray, 73 Ill. 2d 78, 382 N.E.2d
1211 (1978); Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 63 Ill. 2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976).
83. 13 I11. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958). The court also cited Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73,
174 N.E.2d 157 (1961). However, Knierim relies exclusively on the holding in Hall so the discussion
of Hall applies to Knierim as well.
84. Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 514, 468 N.E.2d at 1232 where the court quotes the Hall decision as
follows:
The term "pecuniary injuries" . . has received an interpretation that is broad enough to
include most of the items of damage that are claimed by plaintiffs in this case. Each plain-
tiff alleges deprivation of support as well as deprivation of companionship, guidance, advice,
love and affection of the deceased." (Emphasis added). 13 Ill. 2d 26, 31, 147 N.E.2d 352,
355.
85. Hall, 13 I11. 2d at 31, 147 N.E.2d at 355.
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without proof of actual loss."' 86 This is quite different than the court's
implication in Bullard that the broad interpretation of pecuniary injury
referred to in Hall could include loss of society or consortium for the
death of a child.87 The court went on to say in Hall that several older
cases already held that a child could recover the pecuniary value of "the
loss of instruction and moral, physical and intellectual training brought
about by the death of a father."' 88 Thus, Hall did not expand the scope of
damages recoverable under the Wrongful Death Act at all. Rather, Hall
maintained the status quo.
A more reliable precedent for the court in Bullard was its decision
in Elliott v. Willis. This case clearly expanded the scope of pecuniary
injuries by allowing recovery for loss of consortium by a wife for the
death of her husband.89 The Elliott court also read Hall as implicitly
approving the availability of loss of consortium as an element of damages
under the Wrongful Death Act.90 Since it had been previously held that
intangibles such as a child's loss of a father's guidance, attention, advice,
training and instruction were recoverable as pecuniary injuries, the Elli-
ott court concluded that logic compelled the finding that a spouse's loss
of consortium was equally recoverable as a pecuniary injury.91
Although the court in Bullard relied heavily on the Elliott decision,
it did not attempt to establish a logical relationship between a spouse's
loss of consortium and a parent's loss of a child's society. Clearly, there
are differences, and accordingly the law has treated the concepts differ-
ently. The spouse's loss of consortium is a claim recognized at common
law which is derived from the marital relationship and includes damages
for loss of society, affection, and sexual attention.92 Illinois case law al-
lows either spouse to sue for loss of consortium as a result of nonfatal
injuries to the other spouse.9 3 The existence of this common law action
thus provides a basis for the saving of the claim by the Wrongful Death
Act. On the other hand, a parent's loss of a child's society has never
been recognized as a claim at common law and cannot be recovered by
86. Id., quoting Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 316, 83 N.E.2d 708, 711 (1949).
87. Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 514, 468 N.E.2d 1232. (See the italicized portion of the quote from
Hall, supra note 84).
88. Hall, 13 Ill. 2d at 31, 147 N.E.2d at 355 citing Goddard v. Enzler, 222 111. 462, 78 N.E. 805
(1906); Ittner Brick Co. v. Ashby, 198 Ill. 562, 64 N.E. 1109 (1902); Illinois Central R.R. v. Weldon,
52 Ill. 290 (1869).
89. 92 Ill. 2d 530, 540, 442 N.E.2d 163, 168 (1982).
90. Id. at 535-36, 442 N.E.2d at 166.
91. Id. at 537-38, 442 N.E.2d at 168.
92. PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 5th Ed. § 125 at 931 (1984).
93. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I11. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960) (extended the common law in
Illinois to allow a wife to sue for loss of consortium as a result of injuries to her husband).
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the parents if a child is negligently injured.94 Consequently, there is
nothing for the Wrongful Death Act to obviate when death occurs so
there is no basis for including loss of society in the elements of damage.
95
The failure of the Bullard court to reconcile these differences leaves an
interesting argument unresolved.
The Illinois Supreme Court did not seem to be particularly con-
cerned with presenting a strong analytical argument for its decision in
Bullard. The fact that similar recoveries were already allowed in cases
involving the death of a parent and a spouse was apparently all the prece-
dent the court thought it needed in this case.96 Moreover, the court
could feel secure in the knowledge that it was joining a majority of the
states in bringing an old statute up to present day standards. Nonethe-
less, the primary role of the General Assembly in modifying its own stat-
utes was given short shrift by the court in this decision.
EFFECT OF THE DECISION
Despite the court's specificity in establishing the elements of damage
recoverable, questions remain concerning the application of the Bullard
decision. The court purposely left unresolved the question of whether its
decision will extend to the wrongful deaths of adult children. In addi-
tion, it is not clear whether collateral heirs (siblings) will also be able to
recover for loss of society. It is not surprising, however, that shortly
after the Bullard decision was announced, these two questions were
reached by the 1st District Appellate Court in Prendergast v. Cox.
97
In this case, a thirty-eight year old man was killed in an auto acci-
dent. The decedent was a bachelor who, at the time of his death, lived
with his widowed mother in a house owned by the decedent. The dece-
dent was also survived by four siblings each of whom lived nearby and
was friendly with him. Relying on the trend in Illinois to broaden the
scope of pecuniary injury and also specifically relying on Justice Clark's
94. At common law, a father was entitled to the services of his child. If the child was negli-
gently injured, then the father was entitled to recover against the tortfeasor for the value of the
child's lost services or earning capacity. Since the father was also obliged to provide medical serv-
ices, he also could recover the cost of the child's medical expenses. He could not, however, recover
intangible items such as loss of companionship or society as part of his claim. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 92, at 935.
95. Bullard v. Barnes, 112 Ill. App. 3d 384, 390, 445 N.E.2d 485, 490 (4th Dist. 1983). See
also, Trotter v. Moore, 113 I1. App. 3d 1011, 447 N.E.2d 1340 (2d Dist. 1983), rev'd, 468 N.E.2d
1236 (1984). Accord, Koskela v. Martin, 91 Ill. App. 3d 568, 414 N.E.2d 1148 (1980) (a child was
precluded from recovering for loss of services, companionship, society, and affection of her injured
father by the appellate court which concluded that a new cause of action was better left to be estab-
lished by the legislature).
96. Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 515, 468 N.E.2d at 1233.
97. 128 Ill. App. 3d 84, 470 N.E.2d 34 (lst Dist. 1984).
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concurring opinion in Bullard, the First District Court held that the pre-
sumption of pecuniary injury for loss of a child's society applied to an
adult, unmarried child.98 The court, however, also held that the loss of
society would not extend to the adult siblings since they were only collat-
eral heirs and did not enjoy the same favored position as lineal heirs
under the Wrongful Death Act.99
The Illinois Supreme Court's recent history in interpreting the pecu-
niary injury standard suggests that given the opportunity to review Pren-
dergast or a similar case, it would continue its recent trend of expanding
recovery under the Wrongful Death Act. Presumably, the court would
extend the loss of society presumption generally to all adult children al-
lowing the defendant to overcome the presumption with evidence show-
ing little or no contact between the parents and their child. This would
eliminate separate rules for children who are married or who do not live
with the parents and would allow the jury to determine the value of the
loss of society based on the evidence in each case.
The true effect of the Bullard decision will be seen in the future
verdicts awarded in wrongful death actions involving children. Critics of
the court's set-off procedure for child-rearing expenses are already ob-
jecting to this requirement because it may allow tortfeasors to profit from
their wrongs. 100 Indeed, one of the chief historical criticisms of the pecu-
niary loss standard was that it created a situation in which it was cheaper
to negligently kill a child than to negligently injure the child. The deci-
sion in Bullard has not changed this. The cost of raising a child is sub-
stantial. Recent estimates run from $80,000 to $100,000 up to age
eighteen without any consideration given for the cost of a college educa-
tion. 10 1 Applying the set-off procedure based on these figures suggests
that in the death of a young child where the majority of child-rearing
expenses are still outstanding, awards will remain at their present rela-
tively low levels despite the new element of recovery for loss of society.
On the other hand, there is little doubt that the addition of the loss of
98. Id. at 88, 470 N.E.2d at 36-37.
99. Id. at 89, 470 N.E.2d at 37.
100. Gordon, Wrongful Death/Loss of Society, 73 ILL. B.J. 292, 294 (1984). The author points
out that the setoff procedure could result in a situation where a defendant who kills a child will have
less monetary liability than a defendant who seriously injures a child. When this occurs, he argues
that the defendant would be profiting from his wrong. If the setoff rule accurately reflects the par-
ents true injury, then to the extent that a damage award is not set off, the award becomes a windfall
to the parents and punitive to the defendant. Given these choices, the author concludes that it is
better to allow the parents a windfall than to allow the defendant to profit from his wrong. Id. at
n.37.
101. Dep't of Agriculture, Updated Estimates of the Cost of Raising a Child, 4 FAMILY Eco-
NOMICs REVIEW 24 (Oct. 1984).
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society element will significantly enhance awards in the deaths of older
children.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Illinois Supreme Court in Bullard v. Barnes held
that (1) parents may recover for loss of their child's society in wrongful
death actions; (2) there is a presumption of pecuniary injury in the loss of
a child's society although loss of earnings may not be presumed; and
(3) anticipated child-rearing expenses must be deducted from any award
for loss of society and any proved loss of income. This is a significant
expansion of damages under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act which
brings Illinois in line with the majority of other jurisdictions. Although
the court's holding restricted the expansion specifically to minor chil-
dren, it is quite likely that future litigation will further liberalize the pe-
cuniary injury standard to include recovery for loss of society in the
death of an emancipated child.

